New SSL features for Nginx.
brice+nginx at daysofwonder.com
Wed Jul 22 14:21:23 MSD 2009
On Wed, 2009-07-22 at 12:44 +0400, Igor Sysoev wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 21, 2009 at 08:02:05PM +0200, Brice Figureau wrote:
> > Hi,
> > For Puppet Nginx deployement (that is using Nginx as a front-end
> > load-balancers to puppetmasters), I had to create the following two
> > patches, to match Apache behaviour:
> > * The first patch allows:
> > + a new variant of ssl_client_verify: optional. In this mode, if the
> > client sends a certificate it is verified, but if the client doesn't
> > send a certificate, the connection is authorized too.
> > + a new variable: $ssl_client_verify which contains, either NONE,
> > SUCCESS or FAILURE depending on the verification status. It can be used
> > to send information to the upstream about the client verification.
> > * The second patch adds CRL support to the client certificate
> > verification:
> > ssl_crl /path/to/crl.pem;
> > Nginx then verifies the client certificate hasn't been revoked in the
> > given CRL before allowing the connection to proceed.
> > For access to the patches, please see my last blog article:
> > http://www.masterzen.fr/2009/07/21/new-ssl-features-for-nginx/
> > It would be great if those patches could be merged in the official Nginx
> > source tree.
> Thank you, I have looked the patches, it was really surpise for me that
> OpenSSL 0.9.7 supports CRL. I read in old enough book "Network Security
> with OpenSSL" written when 0.9.7 was being developed, that OpenSSL has
> no built-in CRL support.
Ah, ok. I based all my development on OpenSSL 0.9.8, since that's what
I'm building Nginx againt. And definitely there is CRL support.
Is OpenSSL 0.9.7 a strict dependency for Nginx?
> Then I have looked in Apache's mod_ssl sources and
> its CRL support seemed to me very heavy: mod_ssl does a lot of useless
What I don't get is why they're doing the CRL verification themselves.
I found this comment in the code:
* OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does
* use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it
* explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked
* certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store.
This seems wrong to me, as I already tested, and it works fine at least
in version 0.9.8.
> I think that it's enough to store hash of only public key of
> all CRL certificates (including intermediate ones).
Why reinvent the wheel?
The CRL is a standard thing (see RFC 3280), and basically this is a DER
encoded ASN1 structure containing the list of the revoked certificates
serial number, signed by the CA cert.
> Have you looked
> how CRL is implemented in OpenSSL ?
Yes, I did. It is pretty extensive, and matches RFC3280.
I'll fetch OpenSSL 0.9.7 to see if it supports or not CRL, but I'd be
suprised it wouldn't.
Thanks for reviewing the patch (at least the first one could be merged,
My Blog: http://www.masterzen.fr/
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