[PATCH] Disable SSL renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555).

Maxim Dounin mdounin at mdounin.ru
Mon Nov 9 21:58:05 MSK 2009


Hello!

On Mon, Nov 09, 2009 at 04:49:54AM +0300, Maxim Dounin wrote:

> Hello!
> 
> On Sat, Nov 07, 2009 at 06:23:15PM +0300, Maxim Dounin wrote:
> 
> > On Fri, Nov 06, 2009 at 04:22:03PM +0300, Maxim Dounin wrote:
> > 
> > > Here is proof-of-concept patch which disables ssl renegotiation 
> > > which was recently found vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
> > > 
> > > I've tested it with old openssl (0.9.7e) and most recent one 
> > > (0.9.8l, with renegotiation disabled out of the box) and it 
> > > appears to work as expected.
> > 
> > Updated patch which takes care of openssl problems with disabled 
> > renegotiation (present even in most recent 0.9.8l) and closes 
> > connection as soon as we detect renegotiation attempt.
> > 
> > > Further testing much appreciated.
> > 
> > Still applies.
> > 
> > Some notes:
> > 
> > 1. Patch is for 0.8.22, but it applies to 0.7.63 cleanly;
> > 
> > 2. If you see "[alert] ... unexpected SSL renegotiation" in logs 
> > and it appears to happen on legitimate use - please report.
> > 
> > 3. Patch disables all renegotiations out there, including ones 
> > with backends.  This may hurt setups with backends requesting for 
> > client certs via renegotiation (e.g. apache known to be able to do 
> > so when configured).  AFAIK currently there is no way to fix such 
> > setups to make them secure.
> 
> Updated patch.  It disables renegotiation only for server 
> connections (ones accepted by nginx).  This will preserve 
> configurations mentioned in (3) as there is no reason to broke 
> them (nginx doesn't check backend certificates anyway).

Updated patch.  Fixes null pointer dereference for SSLv2 
connections.

Maxim Dounin
-------------- next part --------------
# HG changeset patch
# User Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
# Date 1257792777 -10800
# Node ID c3abcc1c95af1a564220aabb0bed575a7ded1e7d
# Parent  8da5668048b423cb58a77b9d496956e9cad96709
Disable SSL renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555).

It was recently discovered that SSL and TLS are vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks due to renegotiation feature (see
http://extendedsubset.com/?p=8).

Most recent version of openssl (0.9.8l) disables renegotiation unless
explicitly enabled by application (not recommended though).  Since nginx
doesn't require renegotiation to work - try to disable it for older
openssl versions too.

Note that openssl (up to most recent 0.9.8l) doesn't handle disabled
renegotiation gracefully (i.e. goes to an unconsistent state when client
asks for renegotiation instead of sending back NO_RENEGOTIATION alert)
and we have to explicitly drop connection if we detect renegotiation
attempt.

diff --git a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
--- a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
+++ b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.c
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ typedef struct {
 
 
 static int ngx_http_ssl_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_store);
+static void ngx_ssl_info_callback(const ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int where,
+    int ret);
 static void ngx_ssl_handshake_handler(ngx_event_t *ev);
 static ngx_int_t ngx_ssl_handle_recv(ngx_connection_t *c, int n);
 static void ngx_ssl_write_handler(ngx_event_t *wev);
@@ -175,6 +177,8 @@ ngx_ssl_create(ngx_ssl_t *ssl, ngx_uint_
 
     SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ssl->ctx, 1);
 
+    SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ssl->ctx, ngx_ssl_info_callback);
+
     return NGX_OK;
 }
 
@@ -349,6 +353,33 @@ ngx_http_ssl_verify_callback(int ok, X50
     return 1;
 }
 
+static void
+ngx_ssl_info_callback(const ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int where, int ret)
+{
+    ngx_connection_t  *c;
+
+    if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START && ssl_conn->server) {
+        c = ngx_ssl_get_connection((ngx_ssl_conn_t *) ssl_conn);
+
+        if (c->ssl->handshaked) {
+            ngx_log_debug0(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_EVENT, c->log, 0,
+                          "unexpected SSL renegotiation detected");
+
+            c->ssl->renegotiation = 1;
+
+            /*
+             * rearm disable flag as openssl (as of 0.9.8l at least) loses
+             * it due to bug; this doesn't really matter since we will close
+             * this connection anyway, but just to be sure
+             */
+
+            if (c->ssl->connection->s3) {
+                c->ssl->connection->s3->flags |=
+                    SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
 
 ngx_int_t
 ngx_ssl_generate_rsa512_key(ngx_ssl_t *ssl)
@@ -587,6 +618,12 @@ ngx_ssl_handshake(ngx_connection_t *c)
         c->recv_chain = ngx_ssl_recv_chain;
         c->send_chain = ngx_ssl_send_chain;
 
+        /* initial handshake done, disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */
+
+        if (c->ssl->connection->server && c->ssl->connection->s3) {
+            c->ssl->connection->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS;
+        }
+
         return NGX_OK;
     }
 
@@ -789,6 +826,21 @@ ngx_ssl_handle_recv(ngx_connection_t *c,
     int        sslerr;
     ngx_err_t  err;
 
+    if (c->ssl->renegotiation) {
+        /*
+         * openssl (at least up to 0.9.8l) doesn't handle disabled
+         * renegotiation gracefully, so drop connection here
+         */
+
+        ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ALERT, c->log, 0,
+                      "unexpected SSL renegotiation");
+
+        c->ssl->no_wait_shutdown = 1;
+        c->ssl->no_send_shutdown = 1;
+
+        return NGX_ERROR;
+    }
+
     if (n > 0) {
 
         if (c->ssl->saved_write_handler) {
diff --git a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.h b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.h
--- a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.h
+++ b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ typedef struct {
     ngx_event_handler_pt        saved_write_handler;
 
     unsigned                    handshaked:1;
+    unsigned                    renegotiation:1;
     unsigned                    buffer:1;
     unsigned                    no_wait_shutdown:1;
     unsigned                    no_send_shutdown:1;


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